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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Won (W)
US$ 1.00 (SAR) = W 900 (as of April 1986)
US$ 1.00 = W 778 (as of September 1992)
US$ 0.001 = W 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1-December 31
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 meter (m) = 3.2808 feet (ft)
1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile (mi)
1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.3861 square miles (sq.mi)
1 hectare (ha) = 0.01 km2 = 2.4711 acres (ac)
1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds (lbs)
1 metric ton (m ton) = 1,000 kilograms (kg)
or 2,240 pounds (lbs)
1 revenue ton (rt) = on average approximately
600 kg or 1322.4 lb.
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GOK - Government of Korea
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MIS - Management Information Systems
MOT - Ministry of Transportation
ODCY - Off-Dock Container Yard
PCTOC - Pusan Container Terminal Operating Company
PDMPA - Pusan District Maritime and Port Authority
PECT - Pusan East Container Terminal
PPCO - Pusan Port Construction Office
SAR - Staff Appraisal Report
TEU - Twenty Foot Container Equivalent Unit
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MEPORMADUN TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRE .TORS AND T-E PRESIDENT
SUBJECTs Project Completion Report on Korea
Pusan Port Prolect (Loan 2726-KO)
Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Korea -- Pusan Port
Project (Loan 2726-R0)" prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Region. Part II
contains the Borrower's comments. Loan 2260-KO (US$141 million equivalent of
June 1986) was to help increase efficiency of container handling operations in
the Pusan-Seoul Corridor. This would be accomplished through a port project
planned for completion by end-1990. Shortly after the Loan became effective,
Government said it preferred to use its own funds and requested cancellation of
most of the technical assistance component included in the Loan; this led to the
cancellation of US$6.5 million on October 29, 1986.
Except for problems with land acquisition, which resulted in one
year's delay in project completion, implementation proceeded smoothly.
Installations and equipment for efficient handling of containers in the Port of
Pusan were procured. Congestion in the city of Pusan was reduced considerably
through the provision of sufficient stacking space in the port area, thereby
eliminating the need for off-dock container storage. The inland container
transportation system has been improved, including the utilization of railroad
facilities. Management and financial control over port activities has been
further improved. Overall the project is rated as satisfactory, Its
sustainability as likely, and its institutional impact as substantial.
The PCR is comprehensive and summarizes adequately the experience
gained from project inception to completion. No audit is planned.
This docuLent has a restricted distributifn and may be used by recipfents only In the performnce -
thefr offiefal dutfes. Its cwontnts may not otherwise b disclosed without wortd Bank authorfzatfon.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the
Pusan Port Pr,ject in Korea, for which Loan 2726-KO, in the
amount of US$ 141 million equivalent was approved on June 13,
1986. The loan closed on December 31, 1992. Disbursements
under the loan totaled US$ 134.5 million, with final
disbursements made on January 15, 1992. US$ 6.5 million was
canceled effective October 29, 1986.
The PCR was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure
Division cf the Asia Technical Department (ASTIN), the
Infrastructure Operations Division (EAIIN), Country Department
I, of the East Asia and Pacific Region and the Borrower, and
is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the
Loan Agreement, supervision reports, the Borrower's own
records, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and
internal Bank memoranda.
(ii)
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Evaluation Summary
Objectives
The main objectives of the Project were to: (a)
provide installations and equipment for efficient handling of
container traffic; (b) reduce congestion in the city of Pusan
by providina' sufficient container stacking space in the port
area thus largely eliminating the need for off-dock container
storage; (c) increase efficiency of existing and proposed
container handling facilities and the inland container
transportation system, including the utilization of railroad
facilities; and (d) further improve KMPA's and PCTOC's
management and financial control over port activities.
Implementation Experience
Implementation of the civil works component has
generally progressed satisfactorily. There were also no
problems with procurement. Smooth implementation was however
interrupted by: (a) problems associated with land acquisition
and the relocation of resident fisherman, villagers and kelp
divers, and (b) budgetary constraints resulting in large part
from compensation to the affected residents. These problems
caused some delay in project execution and resulted in a one
year delay in project completion. The problem originated with
the understanding, at the time of appraisal, that since the
fishermen and villagers were squatters, with no legal title to
the land, the government would, as in the past, simply evict
them as trespassers. However, a change in government in 1988
brought about a change in attitude concerning compensation for
expropriated land and relocation of affected residents.
The other main project component was the
implementation of two Action Plans. The first focused on
operational issues within the Korean Maritime Port Authority
(KMPA) and the Korean National Railroad (KNR), and dealt
specifically with increasing the utilization of Container
Yards (CYs) and Container Freight Stations (CFS) as well as
improved access and inland movement of containers. The second
focused on financial and management issues, in particular
commercial and cost accounting, mnanagement information systems
(iii)
(MIS) and construction supervision. KMPA and KNR were
responsible for the implementation of those components
relevant to their individual operations. The Government of
Korea (GOK) however canceled most of the technical assistance
portion of the Bank loan which included the two Action Plans,
within a month of loan effectiveness, although implementation
continued with domestic financing. The Bank participated in
and provided comments on most of the components of the two
Action Plans, but it had little influence on the outcome of
the Action Plans with the result that some of the components
are still to be implemented.
Sustainability
The project is sustainable due to forecasted
increases in container traffic. The outstanding issue concerns
the need to eliminate the Off-Dock Container Yards (ODCY)
located throughout the city of Pusan. It is expected however
that this issue will be resolved by 1995, with the
construction of the Yangsan Inland Container Depot (ICD) which
is located about 20 km from the port and outside Pusan City.
The decision to co- struct the ICD was the result of comments
made by the Bank on one of the studies conducted as part of
the Project.
Findings and Lessons Learned
A number of the findings and lessons learned are
similar to those raised in other PCRs prepared for
infrastructure projects in Korea, and include the following:
(a) Cost-underruns have become normal in Bank projects
in Korea. International costs, as estimated in Bank
appraisals, are not necessarily reflect %ve of
project costs in this country. Local conditions
need to be more fully taken into account in
countries like Korea which have highly competitive
industries;
(b) Korean agencies, like KMPA, are quite capable of
implementing project components which are within
their immediate control. Those outside their
jurisdiction are more difficult, especially where
coordination and cooperation with other agencies is
involved,
(c) acquisition of private land and compensation of
residents in Korea, especially for public projects,
has become very difficult and expensive. It often
prolonas project implementation, incurs costly
(iv)
delays, and makes it virtually impossible to
accurately forecast the required budgetary
allocation for land purchase and compensation. It
may be necessary to introduce a level of public
participation in decisions relating to large
infrastructure projects to ensure timely
implementation of project components which directly
affect the public;
Those more specific to the Pusan Port Project focus
on environmental issues and include:
(a) growth in container traffic will continue in the
foreseeable future. Because of difficulties in
accurately predicting growth levels port expansion
will also continue to lag behind demand. This
affects not only the port but also traffic in and
around the city. More cooperation -between the port
and the city is required to effectively deal with
demand and supply issues emanating from pcrt
traffic, and in particular with growth impacts on
the physical and sovial environments, as either one
or the other, or both, will be af.ected;
(b) Bank missions must be prepared to ask focused
_destions to draw out relevant environmental and
resettlement information, because the Government
may not voluntarily sapply required information, as
it may not be fully attuned to the Bank's needs.
The extent of the removal and compensation
requirements for affected fishermen, villagers and
divers in projects such as this one, would as a
result be more accurate; and
(c) KMPA was not as sensitive to both the social and
environmental impacts of the project during projeqt
preparation and implementation as it is at the
present time. The project has made KMPA more aware
of these issues. Nevertheless, there is still a
need for KMPA to further develop an appropriate
level of sensitivity.
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PART I: BANK'S REVIEW
1. Summary Project Data
Project Name : Pusan Port Project
Loan Number :2726-KO
RVP Unit :East Asia and Pacific
Country :Korea Loan Amount : US$141.Om
Sector :Transport Canceled Amount : US$ 6.5m
Subsector :Ports Disbursed Amount: US$134.5m
Approval Date :6/23/86 Staff Appraisal : O.,tober/85
Effective Date :11/04/86
Completion Date: 12/31/92 Total Project Cost: US$ 261m
Loan Closing : 12/31/92
kppraisal ERR : 35% Re-assessed ERR : 39%
2. Background and Sectoral Information
Appraisal Context
2.1 In 1986, when the Pusan Port Project was appraised,
the population of Korea was about 40 million, growing at an
annual rate of 1.7%. Almost 60% of this population lived in
urban areas, with Seoul being the largest city and Pusan the
second largest in the country. By 1991 the total population of
Korea had grown to 43 million, with the urban proportion
rising to 72%. Although the overall population is projected to
grow at less than 1% in the future, urban growth is expected
to continue at a mucn faster rate (around 3% annually).
2.2 In terms of the Korean economy, the 1980s saw some
fluctuation in growth. For example, in 1985 the GNP growth
rate had dropped to about 5% after experiencing an annual
average growth of around 10% from 1982. After taking on a new
vigor in 1987 when a 12% growth was registered, by 1991 growth
had stabilized at 8.4% with the economy now prcjected to grow
between 1992-96 at an annual rare oi 7.5%.
2.3 Throughout much of the 20 years preceding the
project, the transport system had been strained by the demands
of rapid growth. Massive public investments in infrastructure
had been made to keep up with economic growth. Between 1967
and 1977 the Government had allocated up to 23% of its total
annual capital expenditure budget to expand and modernize
transport infrastructure, 15% between 1977-86 and 12% between
1986-91.
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2.4 The importance of Pusan Port as a major Korean
port, and its focus as Korea's main container port, had
already been established during the early 1980s. The GOK had
made a concentrated effort to encourage the development of new
industrial complexes in coastal areas to take advantage of
Korea's natural potential in harbors, and to exploit low-cost
coastal shipping while attempting to avoid excessive
congestion on road and rail. The Government's main goals for
the transport sector under the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1982-
1986) were to: (a) selectively increase transport capacity by
modernizing equipment and optimizing investments in the
sector, (b) enhance transport efficiency by improving
intermodal traffic allocation and conserving energy; and (c)
strengthen maintenance activities. The Bank's focus during
this period, which was in part influenced by the Transport
Sector Issues Survey Report (No.4423-KO dated 12/27/83), was
on improving the productivity of existing facilities and
improvement of infrastructure, particularly; (a) planning, (b)
regulation and pricing, and (c) energy conservation. In the
port/shipping subsector, a number of sector specific reviews
had been carried out by the Bank. These included: (a) A Survey
on the Prospects and Strategy for the Development of the
Korean Shipping Industry (January, 1985); (b) A Sector Report
on Planning for Fishing Port Development (March, 1986); and
(c) A Sector Report on Container Port Regional Selection and
Regional Development (March, 1986).
2.5 In the Government's Seventh Five-Year Plan (1992-
1996), the GOK's focus in infrastructure has not altered
significantly from previous years. The main areas of
concentration continue to include relief of congestion on the
Seoul-Pusan corridor by expanding the transport facilities in
the Seoul Metro Region, rationalization of transport det. -nd
between Seoul and other regional centers by making the regions
economically self-sufficient, development of inland container
depots in the Seoul and Pusan areas for efficient handling of
container cargo, and development of industrial sites close to
port facilities to minimize transport movement. It also
focuses attention ox, the promotion of rail over road transport
on the major trunk routes, giving priority to development of
mass transport networks to serve both regional and urban
transport, and strengthening the multimodal transport network
for passenger and freight transport.
Seoul-Pusan Corridor
2.6 The Seoul-Pusan Corridor contains some of the
largest urban areas in Korea: Seoul, Pusan, Daegu and Daejon.
In 1985 the population of these cities totaled 16 million (9.6
million, 3.5 million, 2.0 million and less than 1 million,
respectively). By 1991 this population had grown to almost 23
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milliorn (11 millibn, 4 million, 3 million and 1.2 million,
respectively). This excludes the population of the many
smaller urban areas also found in this corridor. Along with
now accounting for over 50 of Korea's population (compared to
40% in 1986), this area also accounts for about 80 of the
country's GNP (compared to 70% in 1985).
2.7 At the time of appraisal the main objective of the
Government's long-term land use plan was to seek a more
balanced and decentralized development on the basis of
integrated regional settlement areas. However, two of the
three primary growth centers, and two of the twelve secondary
centers included in the plan, were located in the Seoul-Pusan
Corridor. As a result, in the eleven years from 1971 to 1982,
passenger traffic in the corridor nearly tripled. To
accommodate this growth, an expressway was constructed from
Seoul to Pusan and the rail service upgraded in the ..orridor
to increase capacity and augment efficiency. Both passenger
and freight traffic has continued to increase significantly in
the Corridor, and coupled with the continued growth of the
urban areas in it, has made the Corridor the prime network for
Korean passenger and freight traffic.
Pusan City and Pusan Port
2.8 In 1985 the population of the city of Pusan was 3.5
million. Although growth has been slow, reaching almost 4
million in 1991, geographically it has grown significantly,
increasing from a total land area of 373 square km in the
1970s to 529 square km by 1991. In 1986 the Gross Regional
Product (GRP) for Pusan was registered at Won 7 trillion, with
an annual growth rate of 6.6% recorded between 1980-1986. At
that time the service industry accounted for about 63% of the
GRP and manufacturing about 34%. Although there are no
official GRP statistics for Pusan in the period 1987-1991, it
is known that the manufacturing sector alone has almost
doubled in its output during that time period.
2.9 The Port of Pusan, located in the city of Pusan, is
Korea's largest port. Its expansion has supported the on-going
industrialization of the country with its imports of raw
materials and industrial goods and export of manufactured
products. The growth of container traffic from 384,000 TEUs
in 1976 to 1.1 million in 1984 and 2.4 million in 1991 is also
partially the result of the increased rate of containerization
of Korea's imports and exports. Pusan Port handles container
traffic for the Pusan area as well as the Seoul and Daegu/
Daejon regions, all of which are located in the Seoul-Pusan
Corridor. In 1991, for example, of the 2.4 million TEUs
handled at the port, 36* remained in Pusan, another 52% were
transported to Seoul and its regions, with the remaining 12%
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going to either the Daegu or Daejon areas in the Seoul-Pusan
corridor. This traffic split between Pusan, Seoul and the
Daegu/Daejon region is however expected to change in the
future, with Pusan accounting for about 28% of the port and
container traffic by the year 2001, the Daegu/Daejon region
about 26% and Seoul 45%.
2.10 Container movement from Pusan to Seoul has
traditionally gone by either road or rail with road accounting
for the largest share (72%) in 1987. In 1991, the modal split
was similar, with road accounting for the movement of about
70% of container traffic, rail about 28% and coastal shipping
only 2%.
2.11 A number of alternate sites to locate further
container facilities were investigated under the Phase III
Port Development Study carried out in 1982. Although the Study
recommended that future port expansion continue to take place
at Pusan, a subsequent study, although concurring with the
plans to proceed with expansion of Pusan Port as a container
port, also recommended the development of Kwang-Yang Bay,
located some 150 km west of Pusan on Korea's southern coast,
as an alternative container port.
3. Previous Bank Involvement
3.1 In ports, Bank assistance has been directed at the
modernization and expansion of facilities to support Korea's
export-led development. Contairerization was introduced at
Pusan under two previous port projects (Loans 917-KO/1401-KO)
and was developed further under the present project, where the
Bank supported government policy measures to increase the
efficiency of container handling, and further strengthened
KMPA's progress in institution building, through improvements
in management and financial accountability.
3.2 A Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR - No. 5756)
was prepared on the First and Second Port Projects in June
1985. The First Port Project, which was approved in June 1973,
provided US$80.0 million for the development of coal and
cement berths at Mukho Port as well as a two berth container
terminal at Pusan. It also provided the framework for a
reorganization of all Korean ports, the establishment of KMPA
and extensive institution building. This project was
satisfactorily completed in August 1979. The Second Port
Project, approved in April 1977 provided US$67.0 million for
another two-berth expansion to the container facility at Pusan
and continued institution building within KMPA. Completion of
this latter project in March 1983 enabled Pusan Port to
implement an effective containerization program attracting
mainline ships by reducing handling costs and expediting the
flow of cargo.
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3.3 Among the main findings highlighted in the report
were the following: (a) it is difficult to accurately project
traffic in an environment of rapid growth as found in Korea;
(b) when creating, or assisting in the creation of
institutions, detailed operating plans for the facilities
should be developed to ensure smooth implementation; and (c)
institutional changes require the commitment of Government,
and to attain that commitment there must be a clear
understanding by both the Bank and the Government of what the
requirements are and what can realistically be achieved.
3.4 The design of the two Action Plans included under
the Pusan Port Project were developed as a direct result of
the need to address the issues noted above. Institutional
development issues, specifically the improvement of KMPA's
financial and management functions were addressed, as were
intermodal issues which focused on improvements in utilization
of the rail terminal in the port, container yards, container
freight stations and inland container handling operations
throughout Korea. This was accomplished by mapping out
detailed steps and actions which were used to monitor and
guide the process. The container handling actions were aimed
specifically at defining more clearly the steps and actions
required to improve the rules and procedures nou.' governing the
usage of these facilities.
4. Follow-on Initiatives
4.1 The Port of Pusan began construction on Phase IV in
1992 and it is scheduled to be completed in 1995. The designs
for Phase IV were developed by KMPA with the assistance of
consultants financed by the Government during the
implementation of this Project and benefits from the
construction of the breakwaters and infrastructure components
which were financed by the Bank under the present loan. In an
attempt to accommodate increased container traffic before
congestion reaches a critical stage, a total of four new
berths are being constructed, with a quay length of 1400
meters. The total cost of this package is estimated to be
about Won 350 billion with financing provided by the
Government.
4.2 In addition, the GOK is in the process of
discussing, with the Bank, still further development of Pusan
Port, to accommodate projected container traffic beyond the
year 2000. The proposed project, which is scheduled for
appraisal by the Bank in FY94 will address not only the issue
of increased capacity and efficiency, but will also focus on
environmental issues including the environmental impact of
port development and the introduction of ship waste disposal
facilities in the main ports of Korea. The specific objectives
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of the proposed Pusan Port Development and Environmental
Project include:
(a) improvement of the urban and marine environment by
providing pilot ship waste disposal facilities at
several of Korea's major ports in an effort to
reduce the pollution of international and coastal
waters caused by ships discharging their wastes;
(b) reduction of the accident risk at the ports of
Pusan and Inchon by developing and providing a
Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS); and
(c) construction of a new port at Daedapo to receive
and process the timber shipments into Pusan, thus
diverting heavy truck traffic away from the center
of the city, and relieving it somewhat of traffic
congestion and air pollution.
4.3 The proposed project will be the first in Korea to
include a comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment and an
economic analysis which endeavors to quantify the main
economic costs and benefits associated with its
implementation.
5. The Proiect
Objectives
5.1 The main objectives of the Pusan Port Project
included: (a) the provision and installation of equipment to
increase efficient handling of container traffic; (b)
reduction in city congestion caused by off-dock container
storage yards by providing sufficient container stacking space
in the port area; (c) increased efficiency of existina and
proposed container handling facilities as well as the iinland
container transportation system (already part of KNR's
objective under the Seoul-Pusan Corridor Project (Ln.2600-KO),
which provides funds to better utilize the railroad in the
corridor; and (d) improvement of KMPA's and PCTOC's management
and financial control over port activities.
Description
5.2 To assist in the accomplishment of the above
objectives the project included the following major
components:
(a) Civil works including breakwaters, a three-berth
container terminal together with ancillary
facilities, and road and rail access to the
terminal;
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(b) Equipment for container handling as well as for
improving railway line capacity, and additional
tracks at PCTOC's CY; and
(c) Technical assistance to: (i) train port planners
and managers; (ii) update the Master Plan for Pusan
Port; (iii) carry out studies to: improve container
operations and utilization of the existing
Container Yards (CYs) and CFS; plan,design and
implement the road access to the expressway;
relocate off-dock CYs in Pusan city to the proposed
on-dock CY; improve container distribution systems
throughout Korea; and define management
organization and operating rules for the proposed
container terminal; (iv) supervise civil works and
erection of equipment; and (v) study and implement
measures to improve financial management in KMPA
and allied organizations, including the development
of a management information system and computerized
accounting.
Design and Organization
5.3 The project was designed to continue Bank
participation in the development of container facilities at
Pusan Port. The project was implemented by KMPA (which also
implemented the Bank's Second Port Project: Loan 1401-KO),
with the assistance of consultants.
Revisions and Amendments
5.4 Except for the extension of the quay from 780 to 900
meters, the provision of a replacement protected anchorage for
fishing boats and replacement housing for displaced villagers,
there were no major revisions or amendments to the Bank-
financed components, but there were a number of changes to the
overall project. Specifically, additional works were
contracted for the CFS building, laborer's shed and sentry
posts. These additions, paid for by the Government using its
own resources, increased project cost by Won 10 million. An
additional container storage area, the Dongmyung Container
Yard, and a new access road to by-pass the city center which
linked the Terminal to the Seoul-Pusan Expressway were also
constructed by KMPA utilizing GOK's own resources. The cost of
these works has not been included in the project cost.
Finally, the Bank financing for the studies and technical
assistance included in the two Action Plans prepared under the
Project were canceled within one month of loan effectiveness.
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6. Project Implementation
6.1 In general, the Project's objectives were
satisfactorily met (para 5.1) except that the relocation of
the off-dock CYs within the city and the reduction of the
traffic congestion caused by their presence, has not been
accomplished due to lack of adequate space at the port. This
problem is being addressed by the construction of a container
storage facility at Yangsan. Implementation of the civil
works components of the project (breakwaters, container
terminal and related facilities, and access road and railroad
link) were generally completed satisfactorily. The South
Breakwater was completed at a final cost of W 31.97 billion
(US$ 41.1 million), slightly below the original contract
estimate of W 32.63 billion (US$ 41.9 million). rhe North
Breakwater was completed at a final cost of W 45.28 billion
(US$ 58.2 million) compared to the original contract estimate
of W 44.72 million (US$ 57.5 million). Difficulties in
construction were encountered when a typhoon damaged the
caisson staging area for the South Breakwater, causing some
delay in construction. In addition, objections to dredging
activities at the sand source (used to form the foundation of
the caissons), which allegedly disrupted economic activity in
the area and caused ecological damage to bird nesting sites,
resulted in abandonment of dredging activities and purchase of
the balance of the granular fill from other on-shore sources.
6.2 The new container terminal was completed at a final
cost of W 62.0 billion (US$ 79.7 million) compared to the
original price estimate of W 51.04 billion (US$ 65.6 million).
This included increased costs resulting from an increase in
quay length and area requirements; the cost of constructing
new housing and infrastructure for the resettlement of
affected "mountain villagers"; construction of a small
breakwater and marine site for the sheltering and berthing of
displaced fishing vessels; and compensation for affected
fishermen, villagers, divers and kelp collectors.
6.3 Except for one section, about 400 meters in length,
where the necessary land has only recently been purchased, the
road and rail link access will be completed at a final
estimated cost of W 9.5 billion (US$ 12.2 million), compared
to the original contract estimate of W 6.7 billion (US$ 8.6
million). Completion of construction on the remaining link is
expected by June 1993.
6.4 Under the project, six 40-ton container gantry
cranes were procured and installed at the container berths at
a cost of W 10.5 billion (US$ 13.5 million). The cranes became
operational in 1991. Another 25 container yard transfer cranes
were obtained at a cost of W 11.0 billion (US$ 14.2 million)
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Of these, one was erected in the rail yard and another in the
reefer area, with the remainder used throughout the container
yard. The cranes were operational in 1991. In addition other
mobile equipment purchased under the project included 31
chassis, 51 tractors, 6 container lift trucks and 9 forklift
trucks (US$ 5.71 million).
Technical Assistance
6.5 The technical assistance component included
supervision of construction, updating of the port master plan
and the design and implamentation of two Action Plans to
improve management and operational capabilities. KNR was
responsible for certain components and KMPA for others. The
Port Master Plan has been completed but the two Action Plans
met with mixed degrees of success. The components handled by
KNR have been implemented while those of KMPA are expected to
be completed by 1994/95. (Refer to Annex 1: Status of Action
Plans). Since most of the technical assistance component of
the loan was canceled in the early stages of project, the
Bank's influence in implementation of the Plans has been
somewhat restricted although a continuous dialogue between the
Bank and executing agencies, concerning these Action Plans,
was maintained throughout project implementation.
6.6 The KMPA Action Plan, which included the following
components: (a) computerization of the commercial accounting
system; (b) the design and implementation of a cost accounting
system; and (c) computerization of the port operations system
as a first step to the introduction of a comprehensive
management information system, has been only partially
completed. Design and implementation of the commercial and
cost accounting systems were delayed due to lack of funds. A
new completion target date of late 1994 for implementation has
now been set. The management information system, on the other
hand has been substantially completed. In addition, a number
of studies were conducted to facilitate implementation of the
action plans. These were all completed. (See Annex 1)
6.7 The KNR Action Plan was intended to rationalize
container transportation by increasing the speed, length and
frequency of trains, improving access to Pugok as well as the
utilization of the facility for all shippers, integrating
Pugok and PCTOC with a computerized system, use of PCTOC to
form and receive all Seoul container trains, and increase
loading and unloading efficiency through equipment purchase at
both Pugok and PCTOC. The main components of this Action
Plan have been implemented successfully. (See Annex 1 for a
detailed description of the implementation of both Action
Plans)
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Procurement
6.8 The Project civil works were divided into four
contract packages, the South Breakwater, the Container
Terminal & Related Facilities, the North Breakwater and the
Access Road & Railroad. All were let successfully under
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) in accordance with
Bank guidelines. However, due to price competition by Korea's
very competent and sophisticated construction sector, all
contracts were won by domestic construction companies. The
contract for Project No. 1 - South Breakwater was awarded to
the Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. on
August 19, 1986 for a bid price of Won 32,632,800 million.
Work commenced in August 1986 and was completed in November
1989 as scheduled. The total cost as completed was Won
31,966,654 million. The contract for Project No. 2 -
Container Terminal and Related Facilities was awarded to the
joint venture of Ssangyong Construction Co., Ltd. and Dongah
Construction Industries Co., Ltd. on April 20, 1987 for a bid
price of Won 51,039,000 million. Work commenced in April 1987
and was substantially completea in December 1991, with only
the CFS remaining. It was completed in February 1992. The
total cost as completed was Won 61,991,106 million, with the
increase due partly to increases in the scope of works and to
price escalation during the construction period. The contract
for Project No. 3 - Access Road and Railroad was awarded to
the Ssangyong Construction Cc., Ltd. on September 28, 1988 for
a bid price of Won 6,704,720 million. Work commenced on
September 30, 1988 and is still on-going, with completion
expected in June 1993. The total cost as completed is
estimated to be Won 9,503,047 million, a 42t cost increase
from the contract price primarily due to a major increase in
the scope of work coupled with price escalation during the
period of construction. The contract for Project No. 4 -
North Breakwater was awarded to the joint venture of Daewoo
Corporation, Ltd., Samsung Ccnstruction Company, Ltd., and
Lymkwang Construction Company, Ltd. on December 29, 1986 for
a bid price of Won 44,715,952 million. Work commenced in
February 1987 and was completed in November 1990, as
scheduled. The totai cost as completed was Won 45,281,701
million including price escalation during the period of
construction. All proc- irement of civil works was carried out
smoothly without maj problems, except for the delays
experienced due to th difficulties described in para 7.2
below.
6.9 Supply and installation of six container gantry
cranes was tendered under ICB with the contract awarded on
December 20, 1988 to the joint venture of Korea Heavy
Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. (Korean) and Liftech
Inc. (USA) for a bid price of Won 8,462,388 million plus
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US$ 2,684,000. Work began in January 1989 and was completed
by the end of April 1991. Supply and installation of 25
container yard transfer cranes was tendered under ICB with the
contract awarded on December 20, 1988 to the joint venture
between Samsung Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Company,
Ltd. (Korea) and Sumitomo Heavy Industries Company, (Japan)
for a bid price of Won 9,459,010 million plus US$ 2,058,170.
Work began in January 1989 and was completed in April 1991.
Procurement of mobile equipment for container handling was
carried out through Korea's Office of Supply (OSROK) using ICB
proceiures beginning in October 1990. In this way, 121 yard
chassis were supplied by Hyundai Precision Industries Company,
Ltd. (Korea), and 10 other, larger yard chassis were supplied
by Jindo Corporation, Ltd. (Japan). In addition, 51 yard
tractors were supplied by Mid-Pacific Industries, Inc. (USA),
nine small and medium forklift trucks were supplied by Samsung
Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (Korea), one
light-duty container lift truck was supplied by the Hyster
Company, Ltd. (Australia), three medium-duty container lift
trucks were supplied by Boss Truck Limited (UK) and two heavy-
duty container lift trucks were supplied by the Hyco Company
(Italy). The total cost of all the mobile equipment was US$
5,706,167 with supply and delivery completed during May 1991.
All equipment was procured without significant problems.
Costs
6.10 Because of aggressive domestic bidding on the civil
works contracts, the costs for implementation of this
component was less than 60% of the original appraisal
estimate. However, land acquisition/compensation costs had
not been included in the Bank's appraisal estimates, actual
resultant costs were about 67% of the appraisal estimate. In
addition, with the Won growing in strength during project
implementation, the proportion of equivalent dollars required
also grew.
Consul ting Services and Training
6.11 The consultants responsible for construction
supervision of the civil works, Korean Engineering Consultants
Company (KECC), provided excellent service to the project.
The costs of these consulting services were defrayed by the
Government from. their own resources. These same consultants,
with their U.S. counterparts provided services for all of the
construction phases of Pusan Port, from the first phase to the
present one. In the first port project the U.S. company, Lyons
Associates, was the lead consulting firm, in the second there
was a joint partnership between Lyons and KECC, while in the
third (present) project KECC became the lead firm using a
different U.S. firm to provide only specialized expertise. The
-12-
arrangement worked very well with the Korean firm becoming
extremely competent in the field by the third project.
6.12 During project implementation three KMPA staff were
given full scholarships to attend a one year masters program
in the U.S. All three successfully completed their terms and
returned to work in KMPA. A number of KMrPA staff and managers
also visited several ports in the U.S. as part of a training
program to learn more about port development and operations.
In addition, other staff of KMPA and EPB studied in the
Netherlands, UK and Japan for varying periods. The foreign
component of these training costs was financed by the Bank
under this Project.
6.13 Disbursement experience on this Project was
generally positive. There was a substantial lag during the
early part of the project implementation period which,
however, was overcome as early delays gave way to better
progress in project execution.
7. Prolect Results and Lessons Learned
Project Results
7.1 Implementation of the civil works components of the
project generally progressed satisfactorily. Competition for
the construction of the civil works was very intense, with the
result that the cost of the civil works was 27% below
appraisal estimates despite some increase in the scope of
works. Smooth implementation was, however, interrupted by: (a)
problems associated with land acquisition and the removal of
resident fishermen, villagers and women divers, and (b)
budgetary constraints, resulting in large part from
compensation to affected residents. These problems caused some
delay in project execution and resulted in a one year delay in
project completion, from December 1991 to December 1992. In
terms of land acquisition and compensation, at the time of
appraisal, no cost estimates were prepared, either by KMPA or
the Bank. This is because it had been assumed that since those
people on the affected property were squatters, with no legal
title to the land, the government would be able, as it had in
the past, to simply evict them as trespassers. However, with
the change in government in 1988, and an attempt to exhibit
more social consciousness, the new government decided to
compensate the inhabitants for lost income and resettle them
in new housing provided by the state. In addition, market
prices were to be paid for expropriated land. Differences in
opinion concerning land values forced a number of cases to be
settled by the courts. This resulted in a one-year delay in
the civil works component and a two-year delay in the
construction of the rail link. At the time of this writing the
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last segment of the rail link from the new terminal to PCTOC,
has not been completed although the necessary land has
finally been purchased, with the rail link now scheduled for
completion by the end of June 1993.
7.2 In terms of operations, the average handling rate of
the new container cranes is less than 20 moves per hour at the
new terminal (it is 17 per hour at the Phase II Terminal). The
cranes purchased have a maximum practical operational rate of
about 24 to 27 moves per hour. It is expected however, that
with further training and the purchase of more chassis, this
rate can easily reach 24 moves per hour.
7.3 In terms of administrative structure, the present
three-tier system, with container yard operators reporting to
KCTA, which in turn reports to KMPA, needs further
rationalization and enforcement of lines of authority. Little
cooperation or communication appears to take place between
PCTOC and KCTA, on the one hand, and between KCTA and KMPA on
the other. The situation, however, does not appear to apply to
the interaction between the operator of the new terminal,
PECT, and KCTA. This issue is to be addressed as part of the
proposed Ports Development and Environmental Improvement
Project.
Technical Assistance and Training
7.4 At the Government's lequest, the Bank financing for
the studies, technical assistance and the Action Plans that
were contemplated during appraisal and included in the Project
was canceled soon after the Loan became effective, the
Government stating that it wished to provide the funds needed
for these components itself from its own resources. The only
exception to this arrangement involved the costs of the
services of expatriate technical assistance experts who
assisted KMI in carrying out the study of KNR's container
operations, which were financed out of the proceeds of the
Loan. The Training Program was successfully carried out with
financing by the Bank from the proceeds of the Loan.
Action Plans
7.5 The Action Plans included under the project have not
been fully implemented. The main shortfalls concerned
relocation of the off-dock CYs and the introduction of both
commercial and cost accounting. The problem with relocating
the CYs appears to have stemmed from the fact that there
continued to be a need for these facilities. KMI had been
contracted to study the relocation of off-dock CYs under the
KMPA Action Plan. Their report concluded that the yard could
not be eliminated until such time as sufficient space was
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allocated elsewhere. As a result there was little to no
pressure placed on the off-dock owners to relocate nor few
incentives offered for them to do so, by either the city, the
customs officials or the port authority. With rising pressure
from the public, due to increased congestion and pollution
resulting from off-dock activities in the city, and the
construction of an alternative location at Yangsan, the
prospect for relocating these facilities in the near future
appears to be better. The Master Plan for Pusan Port was
completed in 1990, with master plans for the city of Pusan as
well as Kwangyang Bay also completed. These plans are expected
to provide more accurate information concerning proposed
future investments, allowing for decision makers to the more
appropriately analyze options. With respect to the
introduction of a commercial cost accounting system, the
Economic Planning Board (EPB) has decided to postpone this
component due to budgetary limitations. With respect to cost
accounting, the work has been redirected towards
implementation at the headquarters level and not the terminal
level (operating companies) as originally envisaged, with
final implementation now postponed to 1996.
7.6 In so far as KNR was concerned, the main objectives
of their action plan have been met. The speed and frequency of
trains between Seoul and Pusan has increased to 12 trains per
day, operating at 90 km per hour, with the number of container
cars also increasing from 18 to 22 daily. Access to the rail
terminal at Pugok has been improved with the container yard
now open to all capable shippers (presently a total of 18).
The Bank's Kyonggi Regional Transportation Project (Loan 2905-
KO), which included the construction of a four-lane toll
expressway between Shingal-Panwol as one of its components,
linked Pugok to the national expressway network which made it
more accessible. Also, the utilization of the PCTOC rail
terminal at Pusan has increased by 40V under the action plan,
to 78%. Finally the length of container trains has also been
increased as has the efficiency of loading and unloading
equipment. What is still missing, however, is an integrated
computerized system linking the Pugok container terminal near
Seoul with PCTOC at Pusan. Implementation of this component
was envisioned under the-aank's (postponed) Railroad Systems
Modernization Project (refer to Annex 1).
Economic Analysis
7.7 The Bank neglected to include, in its cost
estimates, any indication of funding estimates for land
acquisition and compensation. This somewhat distorted the
resultant economic internal rate of return (EIRR). Assuming
that this estimate would have been about 40% below actual cost
(which was the case in the Kyonggi Regional Transport Project:
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Loan 2905-KO, which was implemented during the same time
period as the Pusan Port Project, and for which a PCR was
completed in December 1992), the appraisal EIRR would have
been 29% instead of 35%.
7.8 At the time cf appraisal in 1985, container traffic
in Pusan Port was projected by KMPA and KMI to increase at a
rate of about 7% annually. A reassessed projection, made by
KMPA and KMI in 1990 on the basis of anticipated commodity
flows, shows a more modest growth rate of 4% per year. On the
other hand, the SAR projected base traffic for determination
of economic benefits which formed the basis for the economic
analysis during appraisal was 1.8 million TEUs in 1990 and 1.9
million TEUs in 1991. The latter figure was about 28% below
the actual 1991 traffic of 2.4 million TEUs. The lower growth
rate of 4%, applied to the much larger base traffic amount of
2.4 million TEUs, has a greater impact on projected traffic
values than does the higher growth rate of 7% applied to the
lower base of 1.9 million TEUs. The forecast using the 4*
growth rate leads to an anticipated level of 5 million TEUs
for Pusan Port in the year 2011 compared to the appraisal
forecast of 3.7 million TEUs. The increase from the
anticipated 1.9 million TEUs to the actual 2.4 million TEUs in
1991 occurred despite the cancellation, by a number of liners,
of their container delivery schedules because of the increased
waiting times for berths in the port and a slight downturn in
the Korean economy in 1991 (8.4t GNP growth). However, with
the strengthening of the Korean economy in 1992, and the
opening of the container facilities constructed under this
Project (PECT - Phase III) in 1992, the number of liners
calling at Pusan Port is expected to increase to previous
levels and above. The 4% rate of growth forecast for
containers, therefore, appears to be reasonable. Even with
this slight reversal of fortune, the recalculated EIRR is
impressive, being 39% compared to 35% at appraisal. In
recalculating the EIRR, the quantifiable benefits attributed
to the Project at the time of appraisal were used as the basis
for analysis. These included savings in cargo handling costs,
ship's waiting time and service time.
Financial Status
7.9 Between 1983 and 1985 Pusan Port had experienced a
steadily improving financial situation, in terms of operating
revenues, net income and return on assets. This was due
primarily to a significant increase in containerized cargo
partly due to conversion of breakbulk general cargo. This
performance was expected to continue over the long term due to
the favorable combination of continued traffic growth and
greater productivity. In the SAR (para 6.05) average annual
traffic growth for all traffic (including containers,
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breakbulk, and bulk commodities) was projected to increase
between 7-8.5%s with tariffs increased only to cover inflation.
However, the results in recent years have not been as positive
as projected. Total operating revenues have fallen
dramatically since 1989 while operating expenses continued to
climb, with the result that the net operating income in 1991
was about half that projected at the time of appraisal. The
main reason for this is that with increased congestion at the
port, traffic began to divert to other locations in 1990 and
continued to drop even further in 1991 (para. 7.8). This was
mainly due to decline of general cargo (oil, iron ore and
machinery). There were improvements in 1992, but it is not
expected that a full recovery will be realized for another
year or two.
Lessons Learned
7.10 The following outlines the findings and lessons
learned from the Bank's involvement in the Pusan Port Project.
Many of the points raised are similar to those highlighted in
other PCRs recently prepared for Bank infrastructure projects
(for example, the Kyonggi Regional Transport Project: Loan
2905-KO, the Seoul Urban transportation Project: Loan 2514-KO
and the Seoul-Pusan Corridor Project: Loan 2600-KO), which
were implemented in Korea during the same time period. Those
which mirror other PCRs include the following:
(a) Cost under-runs have become normal in Korea.
International costs, as estimated in Bank
appraisals are not necessarily reflective of
project costs. More attention is necessary, in the
case of countries with competitive industries, to
take local conditions into full consideration;
(b) Korean agensies, like KMPA, are quite capable to
deal with activities which are within their
immediate control. Under these circumstances they
are able to make significant changes. However,
activities outside of their immediate control are
more difficult to change, especially in those
situations where the co-ordination and co-operation
of other agencies or rinistries is necessary for
success; and
(c) The acquisition, or expropriation, of private land
has become very difficult and very expensive in
Korea. Although the government is allowed, by law,
to expropriate land for development purposes,
compensation has become very costly and often must
be decided in the courts (as in this case). Th..s
prolongs project implementation and incurs costly
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delays. It also makes it difficult to appropriately
forecast required budgetary allocations for land
acquisition. Korean society may have reached the
stage where the introduction of a level of public
participation in the decision-making process would
be appropriate.
7.11 Other findings and lessons which are unique to this
project focus mainly on environmental issues and include:
(a) Future development of the Port of Pusan will be
difficult as any expansion will impact either
residents or the environment, or both. Since the
port is surrounded by the city, expansion on land
will involve the relocation of business and/or
residents; if the port elects to expand on water
(reclamation), environmental impacts will require
judicious monitoring;
(b) In project preparation, in addition to visiting the
site, more attention needs to be paid to potential
impacts, and more focused questions asked to draw
out relevant environmental and resettlement
information. The Borrower cannot be expected to
know the level of precision required by the Bank
for its analysis, and the Bank cannot depend
exclusively on the Borrower to provide all relevant
information without guidance;
(c) During project preparation KMPA was generally not
as sensitive to potential social and environmental
impacts of the project as it presently is. However,
as a result of its implementation, their level of
awareness has significantly increased, especially
in terms of impact on project costs and time
schedules; and
(d) It has taken the Bank some time to determine the
significance of the difference between types of
civil servants in the Korean government
bureaucracy. These differences can prove to be
important in the realization of certain budgetary
goals and implementation of envisaged action plans.
For example, in the present case the differences in
stature between staff of KMPA, who are considered
full civil servants, and PCTOC and KCTA, who are
considered employees of government corporations and
not full civil servants, were significant.
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8. Sustainability/Remaining Issues
8.1 With container traffic in Pusan expected to increase
at a steady rate (about 4% annually) the port should maintain
or even exceed the forecast level of net benefits throughout
its economic life. As ultimate success of the project depends
on the continued growth of the Korean economy, and the
economy is projected to grow at 7.59 annually for the next few
years, and projected container traffic nationwide is expected
to grow 8% annually during that period, the project is
considered to be sustainable. The only outstanding issue
concerns more efficient use of the port's container yard, as
well as the new yard at Yangsan. However, it is expected that
the problems encountered presently in the port CY and ODCYs
will be greatly relieved with the construction of this Yangsan
facility, which is expected to be operational by 1995.
9. Bank Performance
9.1 The overall success of the project can be attributed
in part to the good performance by Bank staff during the
entire project cycle. The Bank provided continuity in its
involvement, with a minimum of staff changes, and regular
supervision.
9.2 Where Bank performance did not meet expectation was
in the appraisa2l of certain aspects of the project. There
appears to have been little investigation of the social impact
of the project, specifically as concerns resettlement,
including land acquisition and compensation. Although the
appraisal does refer to fishermen impacted by port expansion,
there is no discussion of the villagers (about 2000), or kelp
divers, who were also affected. In addition, no land
acquisition or compensation costs were factored into either
the project cost estimates nor the cost/benefit analysis.
Although the Bank did identify the fact that some people would
be displaced, it did not seem to appreciate the full extent of
this displacement. In the end over 2000 people were displaced,
at a total cost of over US$28 million.
10. Borrower Performance
10.1 The government and KMPA implemented the project
satisfactorily in terms of civil works and procurement of
equipment. There were, however, problems associated with land
acquisition and environmental impacts which were neglected
during the design stage and had to be addressed during
implementation. The extent of land acquisition and
compensation requirements were not fully appreciated nor were
the costs included in project estimates. This resulted in
implementation delays (para 9.1).
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10.2 At the time of project preparation environmental
aspects of disposal or dredged spoil were also never
addressed. It had been simply assumed, without investigation,
that dredge material would be suitable for use as reclamation
fill. During implementation, however, it was determined that
in actual fact this was not so, and that appropriate disposal
measures had to be taken. In addition suitable substitute fill
had to be located and transported to the works site. The
problem was resolved, but at an added cost to the project.
Furthermore, in the original implementation schedule, the sand
used for the project was to be removed from the Nakdong River,
near the estuary. However, the impact of this action was never
analyzed, nor were any permits processed. As it happened, the
city of Pusan discovered this activity and abruptly curtailed
it, again, necessitating a search for alternate solutions.
This was found without too much difficulty however, and the
project progressed uninterrupted.
10.3 Finally, durina project preparation the Bank, with
the support of the Borrower, had formulated a substantive
technical assistance package, which was virtually canceled
within six months of project approval (one month of project
effectiveness). Such quick action leads one to question the
Borrower's sincerity in carrying out the exercise.
11. Prolect RelationshiDs
11.1 The excellent relationship that has existed between
the staffs of the Borrower and the Bank, during both
preparation and implementation, has been one of the main
factors which contributed to project success. It created good
teamwork, in which each party displayed appropriate
flexibility. This resulted in quick resolution of issues which
otherwise could have significantly delayed project completion.
The relationship between the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI)
and KMPA was also very good, with KMI in charge of many of the
studies identified under the KMPA Action Plan.
11.2 Some inter-agency relationships appear to have been
more stressful. Meetings between KNR and KMPA have been few
and far between, with resultant mis-understandings and mis-
givings. The same applies to the relationship between the city
of Pusan and KMPA, and the Port of Pusan, where meetings to
address differences and resolve issues of concern were rarely
conducted. As a result, one of the main project objectives, to
remove the off-dock container yards located in the city and
place them in a single area accessible by both road and rail
became a long drawn out process, achieved only when the city
itself became so congested that it was necessary to take
definitive action.
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12. Project Documentation and Data
12.1 The covenants contained in the loan agreement were
reasonable and the Borrower complied with them. A side letter
indicating the various studies to be conducted and the action
plans (Financial and Managerial) to be prepared, were
substantially complied with.
12.2 The Action Plans themselves, as well as the Staff
Appraisal Report provided a useful framework during the
implementation of the project. The Project Completion Report
(PCR) for the Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Ln 2267-
KO), and the PPAR for the First and Second Pusan Ports
Projects (Loans 917/1401-KO) as well as the Bank project files
and the Bank supervision reports, provided useful information
for the preparation of this project completion report.
12.3 KMPA records of the project however were both
fragmented and difficult to obtain. Records in the Port of
Pusan were also not readily available. Project data was split
between KMPA and the port with the result that there was no
central source and neither knew what the other had. In future
it is recommended that a central project file be kept up to
date, periodically reviewed by the implementing agency and
available to the Bank upon request.
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PART II: BORROWER'S EVALUATION
A. Conditions leading To The Prolect
A.1 Discussion concerning the construction of Phase III
of Pusan Port began as early as 1980, with detailed drawings
and engineering completed in 1982. However, in those years
Korea was experiencing an economic recession, and as a
decrease in traffic volume was recorded between the years 1981
and 1982 the GOK decided to postpone investment in the Port.
The economic boom of the next few years had not been
anticipated, and when the GOK finally decided that investment
in the port was needed it was about two years too late to
accommodate traffic growth. When the government approached the
Bank for financing in 1984, traffic had grown by an average
annual rate of almost 8' between 1982 and 1984, and container
traffic had grown by over 11. As a result some changes had to
be made to the original design, which prolonged the
preparation phase. The quay length was expanded, some more
land added and the draft increased to accommodate larger
vessels.
B. Main Findings and Lessons Learned
B.1 The following includes the findings and lessons
which were identified by the Borrower:
(a) Land acquisition has become extremely difficult in
Korea over the last few years, with compensation
amounts being far in excess of estimates. In the
future KMPA will attempt to limit construction to
those areas with the least impact on residents, and
in as far as is possible concentrate on land
reclamation to increaL.e port size;
(b) Some problems, such as removal of off-dock CYs and
streamlining customs activities, is beyond the
scope of KMPA. In order to achieve success in
dealing with such issues, the full support of the
city of Pusan is required;
(c) The city of Pusan, although enjoying the fruits of
productivity resulting from the Port, is also
experiencing serious congestion problems. Unless
the port works with the city in identifying
problems created by the port's presence, and works
closely with the city in resolving these, neither
will reap the full benefits of the port's
operation; and
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(d) Container traffic continues to grow at a pace which
outstrips forecasts, making it difficult for the
port to expand at a pace which can accommodate this
growth. Even the development of Phase IV is
expected to be too little too late.
C. Summary of Bank Role and Performance
C.1 The Bank performed well during project
implementation, with an appropriate level of supervision and
expertise provided. Since the executing agency was experienced
in the implementation of similar works, the flexible approach
adopted by the Bank enabled smooth implementation of the
project. During implementation supervision missions were sent
to Korea on a regular basis, about once per year, with the
final project review carried out by the PCR mission in
September/October 1992. Disbursement of the loan proceeds were
prompt, with the contractors receiving their payments in a
timely manner.
D. Evaluation of Borrower's Own Performance
D*1 The Borrower, likewise performed well during project
implementation. The only criticism that can be levied is that
the project began about two years too late to accommodate the
increase in traffic. As a result, during implementation, there
was a great demand to expedite construction and operationalize
the facilities as quickly as possible.
D.2 The only difficulties encountered concerned issues
of respecting acquisition of land, and resettlement and
compensation of affected residents, which were not thoroughly
investigated nor appropriately costed during project
preparation. However, the executing agency vigorously pursued
resolution of the issue of compensation and resettlement of
affected residents, with the result that the project
progressed with only a year's delay incurred.
E. Remainina Issues
E.1 The one remaining and outstanding issue concerns the
completion of the rail access link. The court case involving
its purchase has recently been resolved, with completion of
construction expected by mid-1993.
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PART III. STATISTICAL INFORMATION
Table 1: RELATED BANK LOANS AND/OR CREDITS
Loan/Credit Purpose Year of Status Commens
Approval
First Port Project The project covers the proposals in the 1972-76 Development Program for Pusan 1972 Completed PCR issued:
(Ln 917-KO) and Mukho to meet traffic requirements of these ports up to about 1986 by PPAR No.
providing: 5756 of June
In Pusan: (a) a composite pier to handle containers and grain, with storage silos, 1985.
appropriate equipment and necessary dredging: (b) a dry bulk cargo handling pier
with integrated bulk-handling systems, and necessary dredging; (c) international
(Korea-Japan) and coastal ferry terminals; (d) rehabilitaion of existing general
cargo berths; and (e) a new military berth to be financed by the government.
In Mukho: (f) improvements to the coal handling piers and the mechanical loading
system; (g) improvements; to the existing breakwater; (h) minor improvements to
general cargo and cement berths.
Consulting Services and Technical Assistance: (f) consulting services for the
detailed engineering and construction supervision of above works; the
determination of future development requirements. Technical assistance to assist
in establishing KPA and on the job training of personnel.
Second Port Project To continue development of Pusan Port being financed under the First Port Project 1976 Completed PCR issued:
(Ln 1401-KO) (Loan 917-KO). The project consists of: (1) Civil Works - (a) 700 m extension PPAR No.
of the common user container berths and a 335,000 sq m expansion of the stacking 5756 of June
area provided under that project; (b) dredging to provide an alongside depth of 1985
12.5 m; (c) an access road inside the port limits; a guard house and an 8,000 sq m
container freight station; (d) ancillary works and utilities; and (e) rehabilitation of
piers 3 and 4, the central wharf, and a lighter wharf No. 5. (2) Mechanical
Eauioment - Procurement of container cranes and mobile container handling
equipment. (3) Floating Craft - Procurement of two tug boats. (4) Engineering
Consultant Services - to carry out detailed design and supervision of construcdon
and procurement of the above. (5) Technical Assistance and TraiDins - to assist in
cargo handling (including the handling of containers), maintenance, port planning
and accounting.
Coal and Cement To provide necessary capacity in rail, ports and inland terminals to efficiently 1983 Completed PCR issued:
Distribution Project handle the forecasted coal and cement traffic through the 1980s and to correct the 12/16/89
(Ln 2267-KO) system inefficiencies in coal and cement distribution.
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Table 2: BANK RESOURCES
A. Staff Id
Stage of Project Cycle Number of Stweeks
Through Appisal 62.4
Appisal though Board Approval 53.4
Board Approval through Effectivene 9.7
Supervision 61.7
Prject Completion Report 6.0
Total 193.2
B. NkMhes
Monta/Year No. of Persons Days in Field SpecAizadon Perfo _m
Pr_prto
July 1980 3 16 PAITEIED n.a.
September 1980 3 8 PA/PE/RE n.a.
October 1981 1 7 CO n.a.
November 1981 1 7 PE n.a.
August 1984 2 21 EC/PE n.a.
Jamuary 1985 3 20 EC/TB/PE n.a.
July 1985 6 21 EC/PE(2)/FA/PR/RE n.a.
Apprasl
October 1985 7 21 EC/PE/PA(2)/RB(2)/AD n.a.
Through Board Approval
March 1986 2 7 EC/RE n.a.
May 1986 3 4 RE/LC/PE n.a.
Supervision
Febmuay 1987 1 6 PE I
May 1987 5 6 RE(2)/FC/PEICO
November 1987 4 8 FC/PE/RE/TE I
June 1988 3 10 PC/EC/TE I
November 1988 5 9 PC/RE/PE/EC/PA I
April 1989 1 10 FC 2
February 1990 3 8 FC/AD/RE 2
April 1990 1 2 PR
May 1990 2 7 FC/PE I
?CR Prepation
September 1992 3 5 EC/TE/OA
FA - Financial Analyst _B - Transport Engineer
EC - Economist PE - Port Engineer
RE - Railway Engineer CO - Country Officer
PR - Procurement Specialist AD- Geneal Adminisation
LC - Legal Counsel PA - Port Opeations Advisor
OA - Operations Assistan
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Table 3: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS
Section Description Saus
4.01 KMPA shall provide audited Complied with.
financial statements for the
organization and a separate
opinion for the statement of
expenditures by 08/31 of each
year.
4.02 KMPA and PDMPA shall, in Complied with.
years 1986 and thereafter, earn a
rate of return on net fixed assets
in operation of at least 5 percent
and 7 percent respectively.
Side letter Complete the various studies and Complied with. For details see
implement the actions specified in Annex 1.
the two action plans 'Financial
and Managerial" and the "Inland
Container Handling Operations."
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Table 4: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED ANND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENT
(US$ milUon)
Semester Ending Appra Actual Actual as % of
Estimnae _Etimae
12/31/86 2.0 0 0
06/30/87 18.0 10.0 55.6
12/31/87 35.0 17.4 49.7
06/30/88 50.0 33.8 67.6
12/31/88 65.0 43.1 66.3
06/30/89 80.0 68.7 85.9
12/31/89 94.0 75.0 79.8
06/30/90 106.0 103.4 97.5
12/31/90 120.0 119.6 99.7
06/30/91 133.0 130.8 98.3
12/31/91 141.0 134.5 95.4
06/30/921a __  _ 134.5 _ _
Date of fial disbursement: January 15,1992
US $6.5 miHion cancelled on October 29, 1986.
/a Closing Date
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Ift S: EYf MATEDMOJIWF rCOST AT APRRALSALVS. ACFIJALE l 'mM S
(W MilIlon)
Appraisa Estimate Actua Expenditus
LAoa Foreign Total Lcal Foreign Totid 
Civil Works
South Breakwater 16,581 24,872 41,453 15,235 16,732 31,967
Container Terminal & 32,479 48,714 81,193 33,565 28,426 61,991
Related Facilities
North Breakwater 22,234 33,354 55,588 20,021 25,261 45,282
Access Road & Railroad 20,421 5,128 25,549 6,115 3,388 9,503
Subtotal: 91,715 112,068 203,783 74,936 73,807 148,743
Container Cranes 827 9,220 10,047 8,462 2,013 10,475
Transfer Cranes 875 9,735 10,610 9,459 1,544 11,003
Mobile Equipment - 2,274 2,274 - 4,280 4,280
Subtntal: 1,702 21,229 22,931 17,321 7,837 25758
Teechial Assistance
Studies & Trining 2,679 1,133 3,812 - 275 275
Subtotal: 96,096 134,430 230,526 92,87 81,919 174,776
Value Added Tax & Customs 11,756 - 11,736 - -- -
Duties
Physical Contingencies 4,805 6,722 11,526 - - -
Price Condingencies 14,541 27,109 41,650 - - -
Land Acquisition -- - - 21,200 21,200
Grand Ttarkh 127,198 168,261 295,458 114,057 81,919"s 195,76
41 Exchange rate used for Appraisal Estimates: $1.00 = W900. Exchange rate used for Actual
Expenditures: $1.00 = W750,representing the average rate of exchange during the period that expenditures were
made.
Lb Value Added Tax, Custom Duties and Price Escalaton Costs included.
Is Direct foreign exchange expenditures. Source: KMPA
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Page 1 of 2
Table 6: DETAILED PROJECT COSTS
(Thousnd Won)
Deselption Unit Quantity Amout
ProJect 1: South Breakwater
Dredging m 1,106,790 4,427,160
Sand fill m 3 867,287 4,242,539
Quarry run rock m 3 365,530 6,023,798
Armor stone n3 121.190 4,063,514
Ttrp EA 15,308 1,530,800
Precast conCrete block EA 778 740,100
Precast concrete caisson EA 37 5,730,917
Cap conete 3 58,593 2,579,205
Change orders IS 1 761,844
Mobilization & deMObilization LS 1 490,414
Value added tax (VAT) IS 1 1,376,563
Total 31,966.854
ProJect 2: Container Temdnal & Reat Fadlitles
Mobilization 232,661
Constucton 56,380,327
Cost Escalation 2,239,540
VAT 3,138.578
Total 61,991,106
-30-
Page 2 of 2
Description Unit Quantity Amount
Project 3: Access Road and Railroad
Earth work m3 105,000 450,000
AC pavement m 3 20,200 593,000
PCC pavemt m 3 2,940 161,700
Retaining wall m 930 420,000
Marine clay dredging mn3 108,970 482,886
QRR type III m 3 51,990 1,149,943
Armor stone m3 5,480 201,533
Reclamation 96,000 339,165
Rail m 4,500 4,837,161
Building EA 1 867,659
Total 9,503,047
Project 4: North Breakwater
Dredging m 3 1,236,410 4,442,748
Sand fill m 3 1,005,470 5,218,389
Quarry mn rock m 3 449,260 8,163,082
Armor stone rn3 165,768 6,167,346
Terapod EA 13,571 1,810,831
Precast concrete black EA 1,090 904,038
Precast concrete caisson EA 50 10,490,525
Cap concrete m 3 87,506 3,377,644
Change oiders LS 1 92,906
Mobilization & demobilization LS 1 762,590
Escalation LS 1 1,877,917
Value added tax (YAT) iS 1 1,973,685
Total 45,281,701
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Table 7: OVERSEAS TRANING
Type No. of Govt. Period Place Expenses Courwe
Trainees Agency Contents
Short term 2 KMPA 7/30/88 - USA US$7,592 Tour of US
8/14/88 Ports to review
port
operations,
management &
information
______________ _______________ ____________ system s
Medium 2 KMPA 10/01/89 - Netherlands US$5.494 Port Operation
term 10/30/90 Dfl 5,620 and Coastal
Transportation
Long term 3 KMPA 9/88 - 9/91 USA, UK US$51,677 Business
and Japan £ 60,026 Management,
1 EPB Y 5,670,572 Fiscal Policy
and Marine
Economic
l l l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Policy
___ __ __ *___ _ _  _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ _ _ P lc
Others 4 Various US$10,025 __ _ _ I
TOWal _________ _________ __________ US$279,305.67 I _I
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Table 8: IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE l_
Item Start Completion
SAR Actual SAR Actual
Civil Works
South Breakwater July 1986 Aug 1986 Dec 1988 Nov 1989
North Breakwater Dec 1986 Feb 1987 Sep 1990 Nov 1990
Container Terminal Apr 1987 Apr 1987 Dec 1990 Feb 1992
Access Road & Railroad July 1988 Sep 1988 Dec 1990 Jun 1993 /b
Equipment
Container Gantry Cranes Jan 1988 Jan 1989 Dec 1990 Apr 1991
Container Transfer Cranes Jan 1988 Jan 1989 Dec 1990 Apr 1991
Mobile Equipment Apr 1989 Oct 1990 Dec 1990 May 1991
La Construction of civil works or procurement of equipment. Comparison of dates estimated at time of appraisal
vs. acala dates.
lb Anticipated co_pletion date.
Table9 PORT TRAMC PROJECTIONS - PUSAN POIRT
('OOs Revenue Tons)
1991 3896 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2003 1. ~2 @ 2031
g t ig zLi :. L . 0 ' . ' . -ioi-- ST co, TO wp .ho: ;. <
;,al4 3so33 0aa03 18.3 Impww 3z~oa r,is3 _Fo4a3 ¢ bpws Casital 1'asal d ampc up on Coa*11 bTow Imost awpost Caul 7 otoi
(StaIn 1,156 194 1.175 1,684 116 9,223 2,057 - 144 2,201 2,273 - 176 2,449 2,410 - 214 2.624
oa 1,0IS 12 9,277 10,304 1.256 18 1O,895 12,169 559 25 12,773 K4.355 1.256 - 10.S95 12.169 1.S59 25 12.71 14.355
PatI8 - - - -7 1,024 1,031 S 1,130 - 1,138 9 1.24S - 1,257 10 1,377 1.3S7
Camen 609 56 1,717 1.382 - 110 2.761 2.873 - 127 3,764 3,891 - 153 5,000 5,1531 - 132 6.629 6.811
AhIscb e t5 - 464 479 20 - 496 516 4 - 286 290 - - 174 174 - - 106 106
s8inm 16 111 127 21 - - 21 26 - - 26 29 * - 29 31 - - 31
Cog
Lumbf 1.190 - ,190 2.710 - 2.710 3,486 - - 3.486 3.955 3,955 4,225 - - 4225
mauin. 280 - 280 - 314 314 358 - 358 . 403 403 - 44S - 44S
Ftal 892 - - 892 3,118 - 3,3I8 1,287 - - 1.287 1,484 - - 1.484 1,63 - .683
oine. - - - - - - -
Pbo_ph . .
Rock
aer Ore 397 439 - 836 621 735 1 3,356 866 846 - 1.712 3,207 1.089 - 2.296 1,686 1.422 - 3.108
Macinemy 1,976 1,348 - 3.324 2,542 4.131 - 6.673 3.423 7.090 1 30,513 4.529 11,106 - 15.635 6.062 17.282 - 23,344
Stoa 2,744 3,746 S0S SO.5 4.380 4,t34 tll 9,225 S.366 S.OS1 9T7 11.400 5,S71 6,555 1.173 13.599 6,163 7.820 1.407 15,390
Maua
Stt4 13,97 16 - .213 1.039 16 - 1,055 893 16 909 767 16 - 7S3 659 16 - 675
O0in 16,594 23.,15 1,478 41,887 18,290 26,874 1,856 47,020 23,596 27.226 2,915 51,M 26.931 29.398 4.324 60,653 36.761 30.888 6.310 73,959
TOA*I 27.249 27.720 9649 64S7 3.242 37.348 3U.341 84.93 40.027 41,862 17,363 99,252 48.311 49,984 21.742 120.037 61,21S 59.460 27,437 148,1461
Sourc: KMPA
4.
Table 10: PORT TRAFEIC PROJECTIONS - WHOLE COUNTRY
('0008 Revenue Toss)
'Awntz wpmsT Coagl Totl lapoil EpC Cl Tool 8o &p COstC TOtal I_ s on CoE TOW I mp! Expod Coal Total
Grain 9,406 5 164 9,57S 3S,034 0 44S IS.482 8,3m 0 558 tS.930 19,995 0 660 20.S7S - 21.514 0 V28 22.342
Oil 67.01S 9.629 60,903 137,550 92.491 17.327 83.454 18S272 115,924 14.14S 91.660 221.?19 148.409 18.623 107940 269.,S2 177,999 24.178 126.944 329.121
FM 392 356 46 794 378 30 56 464 474 30 56 S60 697 30 66 683 751 30 56 837
Fertilier 750 968 324 2.042 94S 1,143 320 2.40S 1.127 1.262 320 2,709 1,324 1,393 320 3.037 1,168 1.535 320 3.323
Cem_ 7,232 1.756 21,770 30,758 2,500 5,318 27.252 34.8tJ 0 5.947 38.199 44.148 0 7,047 52.299 S8.346 0 .SSIO 71.598 30.108
AsmbacIw 1,55I 0 2.481 4.032 214 0 2.30S 2.522 41 0 1.330 1,471 0 0 810 83 0 0 494 494
Phgns 27,956 505 I.232 29.693 41,793 0 3,053 44,646 65.606 0 4,383 70.491 70,S95 0 733 7S.328 ?4,833 0 11.990 86.823
Coal
t.mr 9.3S4 52 53 9,453 133.36 0 57 13,793 17.671 0 70 17.747 20.247 0 0 20.247 21.41S 0 135 21550
S* 1.301 0 0 1,303 2,065 0 IS 2,083 2.761 0 18 2.779 3,720 0 0 3,720 4.982 0 to 5.000
Maune 116 291 98 S05 123 350 196 669 60 399 136 765 16S 450 284 699 194 SO0 340 1.015
Pdo
FPesh 917 2 56 977 1,129 5 1 1,317 1.300 6 219 1.624 1.499 5 264 1.768 1,701 5 318 2.024
Fidm
Iron Ore 29.423 0 211 29,634 37.870 0 453 38,323 42,920 0 629 43.449 52,300 0 630 S2.830 63,730 0 S30 64.760
Phosphae 1.S60 0 0 1,S60 1,760 0 0 1,760 1.939 0 0 1,939 .2.141 0 0 2,141 2.368 0 0 2.368
Rock
Odw Ore 3,307 713 1,768 5.708 5,039 1,168 3,469 9,676 7,022 1,344 4,767 13.153 9.787 1.731 6.553 18,071 13,671 2.260 9,031 24,962
Mawbiny 2.301 2,357 728 5,386 2,951 6,313 1.643 10,907 3,973 10,764 2,647 17,384 5,2S7 16.661 3,S44 25.962 7,035 26.236 S.563 38.834
loa 9,637 8,403 6,974 25.014 114.SS7 11.746 38.162 16.360 16,477 16,125 62.952 21.576 23.945 21,744 67,744 67,285 27.993 30.911 26.084 84.893
Matew
SCrp 3,729 40 3 3,772 3,238 40 0 3,278 2,782 40 0 2,822 2,390 40 0 2,430 2,064 40 0 2.094
Odhr 34.602 27.349 33,380 93,331 48,289 39,824 47,363 135,476 72,448 _3.195 74,339 197,9S3 99,36 60.915 110.275 20.57 135,131 70.876 360.974 366,983
iTota 210.546 52,426 130,193 393,365 281,084 81,20 182,039 544,308 370,872 303,609 237,972 712,453 454.470 130.940 313.450 89.660 556,844 164.032 415.223 3,137,049
Source: KMPA
Table 11: PDMPA INCOME STATEMENT (1987-91)
_(Won mon)l
,_ : 11987 1988 19 l99o t991
, Itzm ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~SAP. I Auol SUK I ACO1@ SA~R I ASCAL SAR SA I A1Qd
Operating Revenues
Pon revenues 31,579 31,745 34,803 29,032 38,356 29,439 42,272 30,968 46.589 29,284
Renta revenues 17,296 23,186 19,062 3,444 21,008 29,340 23,153 22,836 25,517 5,828
Equipmn revenues 138 - 152 - 167 - 1 - 203
Subtota 49,015 57.1431 54.016 54,498 59,531 61,127 65,61 56.0021 72,308 37,352
Operating Expenses
Salaries 1.696 1,589 1,834 1,662 1,984 1,994 2,145 2,270 2,320 2.657
Administation expenses 1,182 1,223 1,217 1,488 1,254 1,531 1,291 1,775 1.330 1.902
Maintenance expenses 1,955 942 2,384 600 2,918 604 3,498 723 4,138 548
Depreciation 5,008 5,323 6,471 5,317 8,453 5,811 10,618 6.453 13.568 7.507
Subtotal 9,842 9,077 11,907 9,067 14,609 9,940 17.553 11,221 21.356 12,614
Operating Income 39,171 48,066 42. 1 O 45,431 44,922 51.189 48,057 44.781 50,952 24.738
Non-Operating Income 
_ 
_ 
_
Gain on forign cuency tmanslation 0 - 0 21,651 01 5.210 0 109 0 Is
Others 4,041 3,960 4.041 5,649 4,041 7?500 4,041 5,049 4.041 5,476
Subtoal 4.041 3,960 4,041 27,300 14,041 12,7101 4,041 5.158 4.041 5.491
Non-Operating Expenses
Interest 8,176 9,164 10.871 8,657 13,797 9.057 15,207 8.987 16,027 8.562
Loss from foreign currency 0 11,304 0 548 0 86 0 14.008 0 3,014
Subtotal 8,176 20,777 10,871 9.428 13.797 9,357 15,207 23.202 16.027 11,925
Ordinay Income 35,036 31.249 35,279 63,303 35,166 54,540 36,891 26.637 38,966 -
Specil Gain (Loss) 0 (616) 0 (2,579) 0 (4,371) 0 (246) 0 (1,006)
Net Income 35,036 30,633 35,279? 60,724 35.166 50,169 36,981 26.391 38,966 17,298
Source: KMPA
Table 12: PDMPA BALANCE SIEETS (1987-91)
(Won million)_
l9S7 1988 1989 1990 1991
__ _ _ _ _ SA~~~~~~R _ ACtuW SAR _pAl _ SAR Actal SA Acos SAR ma
AETSM_
Current Asset
Accounts receivable 4,688 3,982 5,167 2,632 5.695 1,273 6,276 218 6,377 241
Stores 289 40 346 42 341 38 511 34 540 43
Others 3 5,267 3 1,614 4 5,899 5 2,585 167
Total current assets 4,980 9,289 5,51 4,288 6,040 7,210 6,792 2,837 6.92 451
Les: current liabilities 
_ 
__ __ __ =____
Curent bain manes 10,739 9,725 18,675 13,793 24,358 14,511 25,107 20,255 25,372 14.891
others 1,777 1,819 2,362 1.931 2,998 1.427 3,305 1,745 3.483 2,5171
Total current liabilides 12,515 11,544 21.037 15.724 27,856 15,938 28,412 22,000 28,855 17,408
Working Capital (7,535) -2,255 (15,520) -11.436 (21,816) -8,728 (21,620) -19,163 (21.932) -16.957 t
D ASSETS 
_
_ 
_ 
_- 
,,, 
Gross value - Land 156,245 140,865 180,647 141,588 206,885 157,431 236,495 693.357 255,291 727,346
Gross value - Odiers 140,231 130,321 181,197 135,523 236,694 146.423 297,307 204,277 379.8941 268.484
Accumulated depreciation 28.033 16,926 34,504 21,770 42,958 26,761 53,576 9,328 67,143 17,399
Net value - Other Assets 112,198 113,395 146,692 113,753 193,737 119,662 243.731 194,949 312,751 251,085
Total net fixed asses 268,443 254,260 327,339 255.341 400,622 277,093 480.226 888,306 568,042 978,431
Work in progress 90,582 56,272 111,483 112.469 121,429 153,702 126,741 123,628 42,634 97,941
Total fixed assets 359,0251 310,532 438,8221 367,810 522,051 430,7951 610,675 1,011.934 606,967 1,076.372
THER ASSETS 18 13 141 13 19 13 14 16 19 16
Total Assets 351, 308,290 423,3151 356,387 500,254 422,0 585,3t. 992.787 588,762 1059.431
Labilities and Equity 
_ _
LoTg tem debt 106,072 116,708 130,958 100,502 154,371 84,539 158,4941 108,748 152,022 110.730
Total equity 245,437 191.582 292,357 255,885 345,883 337,541 426,867 884.0391 436,740 948,701
Total liabilities and equity 351,509| 308.2901 423.3151 356.3871 500,254 422.080| 585,3621 992.7871 588.7621 1,059.431
Source: KMPA
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Table 13: MONITORING INDICES
Development of Financial and Managerial Functions
Need for and Target date for Actoal implemneamon
origin of implementation
assistnc
Impeenin Korea J Forein St1 1nd Start End
DEVELOPING MAIN FUNCTIONS
Commercial Accoundtn
Prepare TOR for accoundng KMPA X Ongoing 10/01/86 10186
computedrzation
Computerizaiton umplemention plan KMPA X 09/01/86 05/31/88 10/15/86 05/31/87
Obtain staffing approval KMPA/MOGA - 01/01/81 06/30/89 - 09/90
Slaged implementation DMPAs X - 12/31191 IV31/95 07/10/91 12/31/93
Costn Accountina
System design TOR KMPA - Ongoing 10/01/86 - 10/86
Design cost system KMPA * X X 01/01/87 06/30/87 07/10/91 03/31/92
Initial implementation KMPA/PCTOC - - 01/01/89 01/01/91 -
Staged manual implenentation PDMPA X - 01/01/89 01/01/91 -
Computerized conversion DMPAs X 01/01/91 12/31/92 04/01/92 12/11/93
Manafentent Informadon System (MIS)
Submit TOR to IBRD KMPA - - Ongoing 10/01/86 - 10/86
Evaluate existing infor..u.. ystem KMPA X 09/01/86 06/01/87 10/15/86 05/31/87
Develop master plan KMPA X X 07/01/87 06/30/89 10/15/86 05/31/87
Incorporate accouting needs KMPA X - 07/01/87 12/31/88 10/15/86 05/31/87
Test implementadon KMPA/PCTOC X - 01/01/89 12/31/89 10/25/89 12/91
Link systems DMPAs X - 01/01/90 12/31/95 01/04/92 Ongoing
INSrRUMEM'S
Trairing
Implement a management raining KMPA/MOT X X Ongoing 06!01/88 -
program
Train senior management in computer KMPA/MOT X - 06/01/87 06/01/89
applicadons
Cotaguterization
Develop a S year comnputerization KMPA/MOGA X X Ongoing 1995 - -
program for:
Commercial accountng, budgetng. - -- 03/01/89 11/30/91
property and supply control, cost
aCcounting, strategic planning, - - 04/01/92 12/31/93
port operadons (PORTMJS). cargo
stadstics, personnel management, etc.
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ANNEX 1
Page 1 of 7
STATUS OF ACTION PLANS
Acdon Results
MASIER PLAN * TORs submitted to the Bank for teview as agreed
Updating the Master Plan for Pusan Port * Study by KMPA started in early 1988
e Draft report reviewed by Bank mission in December 1988
* Final report scheduled for April 1989
* Final report received lanuaty 1990, presented to Bank
mission in Februaty 1990; presentation included City of
Pusan Master Plan and the Master Plan for Kwangyang
Bay
a Bank provided its comments
E OPERATIONAL STUDES - ACTION PLAN
A. KM!4A
* Project conducted by PCTOC
1. nrase utilizaion of CY and CFS
* Study completed by Woodward Clyde Consultants in 02/87
* Bank comments provided 05/87
* Studies conducted by American President Lines (APL) in
1986 and 1987
* CFS opened to US flag carriers on 01/88
* Expansion of CY started in mid-1988
* Double cycling and new yard layout started in 1988 based
on recommendations provided by APL
* CFS under utilized - consideraton given to making CFS
available to other foreign flagged ships
* Staring 01/89 CFS open to all carriers
* CFS sdll under utilized due in large part to the existence of
contracts with the various off-dock CYs
* CY was expanded - total ground slots increased by 800 to
9,900
* Plans made to increase ground slots by 800 to total 10,700
* Utilization of CFS still under capacity
-39-
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Action Results
2. Improve access procedures to PCTOC rail e Addressed in updating of Master Plan and in the revised
terninal design of container terminal
a KMI study completed in 1988 and sent to Bank in 1989
e Considered to not be feasible in prior years, KMPA again
reviewed the issue to determine if a flyover is practicable
e No improvement is envisaged; KMPA believes that
congestion will lessen with the full operation of the new
container terminal.
3. Increase throughput capacity of PCTOC * Free time for imports and exports standardized for all
carriers at S and 4 days raspectively on 01/88
o Increased investment in straddle carriers and transtainers
during 1988 and 1989
* Estimated volume for 1988 is 1.22 million TEUs versus
appraisal estimate of .998 million
* Target for maximumn stacking of 14,000 TEUs has been
achieved.
CY capacity increased from 17.500 TEUs in 1988 to over
19,000 but target level is 12,000-beyond that level,
efficiency declines
o A ninth container crane was installed in 1989 along with
additional yard equipment referred to above
* Gantry cmane net productivity has increased steadily from
the low of 17 in 1986 to 21.1 in 1988 and 22.4 in 1989
o Productivity of cranes declined in 1990 to 21.5 teu/hr.
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Action Results
4. Relocation of off-dock CYs to Dongmyung * KMI contracted to do study
* Preliminary work and draft reports discussed with Bank
* Bank comnments on draft report were issued in 11/87 but
could not be reflected in fmnal report because contact was
over
* Report concluded thg yards could not be eliminated until
completion of the fourth phase expansion due to the
excessive number of containers moving through the port
e KMPA attempting, utilizing Bank's comments, to reduce
congestion in city
o MOT considered developing an inland terminal north of
Pusan, at Yangsan, to consolidate some of the yards
located in the city
* Decision made to incorporate Dongmyung into thind phase
CY
* Off-dockyards will be consolidated into Yangsan ICD
(about 20 km northwest of Pusan) when completed in
1994: area, consising of 1.5 million sq m, has good mrad
and raD access
* Decision made to construct ICD at Yangsan in May 1991:
should be operational in 1994/95, to be operated by Korea
Container Teminal Authority: decision also made to
convert Bugok into an ICD to be operated by KNR.
5. Extend storage capacity of PCTOC a Study conducted by KMI
* Draft TORs provided to Bank mission and comments
pTovided 05187
* Revised TORs reviewed by Bank mission 11/87 and
comments included in final TORs
o Study completed in late 1988 and copy sent to Bank in
1989
* Inland terminal considered by MOT and the utilization of
Bugok terminal increased by KNR
* Yangsan ICD will begin operauon in 1994/95
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Acdon Results
6. Expand capacity of PTOC rail terninal * Issue addressed in updating of master plan
* KMI study completed in 1988 and a copy sent to Bank in
1989
* Starting in 1989 cut-off schedules were revised to allow
KNR an additional 10 hours of delivery time, new
procedures increased uiilizadon to 78 percent of capacity in
1989 from about 40 percent in prior years
* No action can be taken to expand rail terminal, as
reconmend by KMI study, until third phase reaches full
operation because expansion would reduce the amount of
available CY at PCTOC
7. Develop organizadion and managemrent plan * KMPA undertook study
for new terminal
* Draft report made available for review by Bank
* Legislation passed in 12/89 to create new company to
manage aUl container terminals in Pusan, Kwangyang Bay
and Yangsan; company formed in 04/90: company is
financially independent and reports to PDMPA: new
management and informtadon systems are being developed
starting in 1990
* Korea Container Terminal Authority became operational in
April 1990 responsible for operations of aU national
conainer terminals: operations of the third phase termina l
was awarded to a consortium of private stevedoring firms
in Pusan and PCTOC
B. KNR * 12 trains including one irregular train are operating per
day per direction
1. Increase speed and frequency of trains
between Seoul and Pusan * Train speed improvement of 90 km/h as of October 5.
1990
* Increased frequency of container cars from 18 trains to 22
trains a day as of August 20, 1992
2. Improve access to Pugok for all shippers a Pugok container yard is open to all capable shippers. At
present 18 companies are using yard
3. Improve utilization of Pugok CFS * One CFS is being operated by Saebang Company
4. Use PCTOC Rail Terminal to formn and * Udlization of Rail Terminal increased to 78 percent of
receive all Seoul container trins capacity in 1989 from about 40 percent in previous years
5. Integrate Pugok and PCTOC using some * This is being implemented as a part of the OIS project
computerzed system
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6. Further increase train length e The length of container train (regular) was increased from
22 cars beginnng in May 1990
* When the extension of passing loops (19 stations in
Kyongbu line) from 500 mn to 630 m is completed at the
end of 1993, it will be possible to increase the length of
container trains from 25 cars to 30 cars.
7. Daily roundtrip e Container trains usually operating at night
a Daily roundtrip will be possible after construction of
_Kyongbu High Speed Line
8. Reinforce loading and unloading equipment at * 5 transtariers, 26 top handlers and 24 forklifts are being
Pugok and PCTOC operated
9. Others Present charging system (Pugok-Pusanjin):
a. Inprove charging system
Classificatn 45 40 20
.__________________________________________ loaded empty loaded empty loaded empty
Basic rate (unit won) 245,23 130,79 224,21 112,100 112,100 56,050
0 0 0
1 5 Is
Discounti) g UP 15 *'20 15 *20 15 *20
* 20% discoum of basic rate in case of the contracted traffic
over 15,000 ton in a year (Only down empty container)
b. Construction of access to railroad at Pusan Port
a 'Me rail entrance between Pugok and Pusanjin is under
construction by KMPA
* Operate average 6 tains a day between Pugok and PCTOC
C. By KMIPA and KNR * Detailed designs being prepared by KMPA
1. Improve road aceess to on-dock and * Funding for land acquisition approved
Dongmyung CYs
* Road to open in late 1991 or early 1992
o Funding provided by EPB. procurement under LCB
* Construction started in May 1989 with completion date of
late 1991
2. Re iue interference at entrance to PCTOC * Determination mnade by PDMPA and city that proposed
changes are not possible
o No furtetr actions planned
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3. Design and implement management and o KMI study contpleted in 1988. sent to Bank in 1989
marketing system for container services of
KNB, PCTOC and new terminal e No actions taken, limited coordinadon between KMPA and
KMI; issue discussed with both agencies and MOT;
mission recommendeda Special Committee be formed by
MOT in 1990 to address issues related to improving the
transportation information system.
Im. FINANCIAL AND MANAGERIAL ACTION o Work by KAIST and Ahn Kwon
PLAN
o System design scheduled for 12-15 months
1. Commercial Accounting
e Project originaly scheduled for mid-1990
* Project bas been postponed-lack of funding due to
reduction in 1989 budget is one reason for delay-other is
lack of interest
* Govemment is &onsidering requiring that KMPA use
commercial accounting-this would help the component.
Otherwise this item is not very attive to a govemment
agency
* EPB has decided to postpone this component work will
resume startng in about 1996; delay is due to budgetaty
limitation
* No further actions planned untl budget is made avaiable
2. Cost Accounting * Design of the mamua system by Ahn Kown and the
computerization by KAIST
* Work being directed towatd headquarters level and not at
the terminal opemting companues
* Design of manual system completed and submitted to
KMPA for review-modifications to tbe system. Tmaining
and use of mansual system started in 1989
* Design of computerized system will be done in conjunction
with the commercial accounting system-this work being
postponed due to budgeary problems
* Consideration being given to providing PCTOC with the
necessaty budget to modify this system so that it can be
used at the operating level
* Plans for work at PCTOC postponed due to the decision to
create a new container operating company; CM?A agrees
to continue this project as part of the new information
system for the operating companies (see item 11 A 7)
• Work on the system in KMPA will be postponed until
1996 to coincide with tde computenzatikn of the
accountig system
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3. Management Information System o Working by KMI and KAIST
* Detailed design of PORTMIS completed by KAIST and
KMA
o Development of the system stated in 1989.
o Implementation at Pusan to be done before being
implemented at the other major ports
o System is not completed in that it does not address the
infoniation tequirements of many of the port operations
such as the operating terminals
* Completion of Phase I of PORTMIS started in 1991-it
consists of connecting three smaller ports into the systems
at PDMPA-completion scheduled for 1993
* Implementation of the vessel management system started at
PDMPA in 01/90, implementation of cargo management
system started at PDMPA in 07/90
* Work on the two remaining systems completed in 1990 and
unplemetiation at PDMPA started in late 1990
* Plans are for the final three legs to be completed by 2000;
delay is due to budget restrictions
IV. CONSMUCTION SUPERVISION * Korean Engineering Consultants Corporation (KECC) is
the prime contractor but will use foreign staff when special
expertise is needed
* Agreement was reached with foreign consultans - Plannng
Research Corporation (PRC) and personnel were assigned
